

# THE MOVEMENT OF I'TIMĀD IN NAZZĀM'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: WHATNESS OF IT AND ITS FUNCTION

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## ABSTRACT

This study analyzes Nazzām's conception of motion and seeks to answer the question: "How does an object move from one space to another one?" In Mu'tazilite thought, the motion of the objects is explained with the concept of *i'timād*. The equivalent term for *i'timād* was generally given as the "weight of objects". Nazzām, the Mu'tazilite thinker, has a different theory of *i'timād*. According to him, the *i'timād* is a movement for pushing. There are two conditions for the occurrence of *i'timād* (i) 'inhisar' (to be surrounded by the air and water) and (ii) 'hadaf' (the natural goal of the objects). Motion is not limited to only a change in terms of space, quality, and quantity but also motion is about categories of beings, which consist of substance.

**Keywords:** Mutāzilā, Nazzām, i'timād, movement, nature

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For the sake of expediency transliterations of Arabic words are given for the first occurrence of a word and then omitted.

As widely accepted in Mu'tazila, actions are carried out with the power given by God. According to this idea, the one who acts does so by reducing the options open to different directions provided by the power given to him before the action to one with his knowledge and orientation<sup>1</sup>. The kalām-philosophers<sup>2</sup>, who argued that actions and movements cannot be seen as the same thing and, therefore, movements must be dependent on an element other than power, thought that each object has a different form of movement, as in the examples of the fall of a stone on a raft or the rise of fire in a burning wood. Therefore, there must be a cause that differentiates their movements<sup>3</sup>. In Mu'tazilite kalām, the cause of physical movement is commonly explained by the concept of i'timād. Through the concept of i'timād, the theologians wanted to explain their thoughts on physics, more specifically, causality.<sup>4</sup>

The content of this element, which enables objects to move to a different place, is not the same for all kalāmists. Mu'tazilite thinkers determined the content of the concept of i'timād, which they regarded as the cause, as weight, repulsion (mudāfa'a), wetness (rutūbet), or motion in line with their ideas on physics<sup>5</sup>. Although the Mu'tazilites differed in their views on the cause of motion, they sought to answer the same question: What causes an object to move to another place?

This question is also important for Nazzām<sup>6</sup> (d.231/845). According to him, the movement of i'timād is at the basis of all movements in an object. The aim of this article is to try to

determine what Nazzām understood by i'timād motion. We have very few texts to make this determination. The references, many of which are repetitions of each other in the *maqalāt*, are not sufficient by themselves to determine what al-Nazzām meant by the movement of i'timād. Nevertheless, the outlines of Nazzām's thought on nature have reached us. In this respect, it is possible to test and clarify these short statements with Nazzām's general idea of nature. Another aspect that makes it possible for us to determine what Nazzām understood from the i'timād movement is that we have enough of the statements of the late Mu'tazilite thinkers who discussed i'timād vividly and intensively<sup>7</sup>. These discussions make it possible to determine the framework of the subject.

In the modern literature on Nazzām's thought, although his views on the i'timād movement are included, there is no separate study devoted to this subject. In his study "Ueber den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam", Horevitz associated the i'timād movement with the Stoic idea of movement. In this respect, he brought a different discussion to the subject. In his work *Ibrahim b. Sayyār en-Nazzām ve Ârauhu'l-Kelâmiyyetu'l-Felsefiyye*, Muḥammad 'Abdulhādî Abū Rîde discussed al-Nazzām's ideas about the i'timād movement in detail. However, this study neglected some texts that would clarify the concept in question. Mehmet Dağ's article "The Concept of Movement in Kalām and Islamic Philosophy" is important in terms of being the study that deals with the content of the concept of i'timād in Islamic thought in the widest way. In this work, al-Nazzām's idea of motion is discussed in general and especially the idea of *tafra* is explained in detail. However, the author does not explain al-Nazzām's movement of i'timād, although he states that he will explain it later<sup>8</sup>.

1 See al-Qādî Abduljabbâr b. Ahmad al-Hamadânî, *al-Mughnî fi Abwâbi al-Tawhîd wa'l-Adl, IV-IX, XI-XVII, XX* ed. Mahmûd Muhammed Qâsim, ed. Ibrahim Madkûr and Tâha' Huseyin, Kâhire tsz., V, 205; VI, 27; *al-Muhît bi't-Teklîf* (compiled by Ibn Mattawayh), ed. Ömer es-Seyyid 'Azmi', ed-Dâru'l-Misriyye, Kahire, n.d., I, 50-59; For the different views of Mu'tazilite thinkers on might see, Ebu' Reşîd Sa'îd b. Muhammed Nisâbüri, *el-Mesâil fi'l-Hilâf beyne'l-Basriyyîn ve'l-Bağdâdiyyîn*, ed. Ma'n Ziyade and Rıdvân es-Seyyid (Beyrût: Ma'hedu Inmâi'l- 'Arabi, 1979), 280-284.

2 The discipline of "kalam" is usually translated into English as "theology", or sometimes as "dialectical theology". Both translations are wrong because most of the kalam thinkers do not accept theology as a science. It simply means philosophy in general but we will use the phrase "kalam-philosopher" to distinguish these thinkers from the Aristotelians who call themselves as true philosophers. However, the Arabic name of these thinkers is "mutakallim" and we may use this also. In Turkish usually the word "kelamcı" is used to refer to them.

3 See, Ibn Mattawayh Hasan al-Najrânî el-Mu'tezilî, *et-Tezkiretu fi Ahkâmi'l-Cevheri ve'l-A'râd*, ed. Sâmî Nasr Lutf and Faysal Bedir (Qahira: Dâru's-Saqâfeti li't-Tibâ'eti wa'n-Nashr, 1975), 538; 'Adûdu'd-Din Abdurrahman al-Îjî, *al-Mawâqif fi 'Ilmi'l-Kalâm* (Beyrût: Âlemu'l-Kutub, n.d.), 125-130.

4 Qadi Abduljabbar, *al-Mughnî*, IX; Imâm al-Haramayn al-Juweynî, al-Shâmil fi Usuli'd-Din, ed. Ali Sami en Neşşar (İskenderiyye: Manshaatu'l-Mearif, 1969), 495; 'Îjî, *al-Mawâqif*, 125-130.

5 Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 538-539; 'Îjî, *al-Mawâqif*, 125-131.

6 For detailed information about Nazzām see, Kemal Işık, "Nazzâm ve Düşünceleri" *Journal of İslam İlimleri Enstitüsü*, vol3, 1977; Nazmî Sâlim, Muhammed Aziz, *Ibrahim b. Seyyâr en-Nazzâm ve'l-Fikri'n-Nakdi'fi'l-İslâm* (İskenderiye: Müessesetu Shabâbi'l-Jâmi'e, 1983).

7 In this article, the Mu'tazilite period before Abū Hâshim al-Jubbâ'î is referred to as the first period, and the period after Abū Hâshim is referred to as the last period.

8 Mehmet Dağ, "Kelâm ve İslam Felsefesinde Hareket Kavramı", *Journal of Ankara University Theology Faculty*, XXIV, vol 1, 1981, 221-248; For other works about concept of i'timad see, Alnoor Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kelâm: Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Mu'tazili Cosmology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 16; Richard Frank, *Beings and their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mutazila in the Classical Period Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1978), 194.

## I. WHATNESS OF MOVEMENT OF I'TIMĀD

In the early period of the Mu'tazilites, the state of change of an object was commonly classified with the concepts of *motion* and *rest*. Being at rest was regarded as the state of the body in a single space, while movement was regarded as its transition to a second space<sup>9</sup>. As a matter of fact, Abu'l-Hudhayl (d.227/841) said that two places and two times are needed for movement to occur, while only two times are needed for being at rest<sup>10</sup>. Nazzām's classification is different: "Movement is of two kinds: I'timād movement and nuqlā' (intiḡāl) movement."<sup>11</sup> What is meant by the movement of intikāl is the displacement of an object, which is, moving from one place to another place.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, what Abu'l-Hudhayl meant by the concept of movement, Nazzām meant by the concept of intikāl. In the classifications of movement attributed to Nazzām, the term *zawāl* was also used instead of *intikāl*<sup>13</sup>. The word *zawāl*, which has a close meaning with the word intikāl, has some linguistic differences. For example, the word *zawāl* does not require stability in a place. In addition, this word has the meanings of inclining, moving a lot, and changing not only spatially but also in every aspect.<sup>14</sup>

The debate between Abu Alī al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/915) and Abu'l-Ḥasan al-'Ash'ari (d. 324/935) on the words *intiḡāl* and *zawāl* reveals that the Kalam thinkers attach importance to the choice of these similar words. In this debate, Jubbā'ī, who tried to prove that every movement is *zawāl* but may not be *intiḡāl*, states that the term *zawāl* can be used for a rope hanging from a branch but not for the word *intiḡāl*<sup>15</sup>. As will be discussed later, Nazzām's use of the term *zawāl* as an obstructive factor to be eliminated for the change in the object is not

only a conscious use, but also a preference compatible with his language about nature.

Considering that Mutazilite thought has a close relationship with language, giving the meaning of this concept in everyday language before moving on to the discussions around i'timād can be considered as a helpful factor in establishing the framework of the discussions. The word i'timād, which comes from the root "a-m-d", means to turn towards something, to intend it, and to support it. For example, when used with the word wall, it means to strengthen. The derivatives of this word from the verb form mean to lean on something, to lean against something, while the derivatives from the noun form mean pole, cane, all kinds of objects that carry weight, and support tools that enable the patient to walk.<sup>16</sup> It seems that in i'timād and its derivatives, the meanings of turning towards and giving strength to something seem predominant. When it is used in kalām books in its dictionary meaning other than being a term, it is used in the sense of bringing evidence in reaching conclusion-knowledge.<sup>17</sup> The word i'timād in these texts means what is meant to be expressed in Turkish when we say, "We rely on this knowledge" or "our basis is this."

The clearest explanation of the nature of i'timād is given as "*being at rest is movement as i'timād*" in Nazzām's *Maqālāt*, which discusses the idea of movement.<sup>18</sup> For Nazzām, there is no real equivalent of "being at rest" (inertia); it has only a linguistic equivalent:

(Nazzām said), all objects are moving in reality, and being calm is only in the tongue. Movements are nothing but kawn (becoming). ... When I speak of being at rest, I understand something to be in the same place at two different times.<sup>19</sup>

The fact that Nazzām, as an absolute rejectionist of rest, accepted being at rest only in language can be regarded as an objection to Muammar b. Abbād (d. 215/830). Muammar, who asserted that all objects are basically at rest, argued that motion has a counterpart only in everyday language.<sup>20</sup> Nazzām draws the same conceptual framework for the movement of

9 Ebu'l-Hasan Es'ari, *Makâlâtü'l-İslâmiyyîn*, ed. Nevâf el-Cerrâh (Beyrût: Dâru Sâdir, 2008), 202,

10 Ibid, 202.

11 Ibid, 187. In another place, al-'Ash'arî explains the relationship between the concepts of quiescence and i'timād for al-Nazzām as follows: "All human actions are movements, and movements are accidents. Tranquillity is valid only in language. When an object stands (i'timād) in a place for two times, it is said 'it has been at tranquility in the place', otherwise the meaning of tranquility is nothing other than its i'timād" (*Maqâlât*, 198).

12 Abû Muhammed Ali b. Ahmed İbn Hazm el-Endulisî, *al-Fasl fi'l-Milel wa'l-Ahwa' ve'n-Nihal*, I-V, ed. Muhammed Ibrahim Nasr and Abdurrahman Umeyre ( Beyrut: Dâru'l-Jil, 1996), V, 175; Şehristânî, Ebu'l-Fath Muhammed b. Abdilkerîm, *al-Milel ve'n-Nihal*, Müessesetü'l-Kütübi's-Seqâfiyye, Beyrût, 1994, 42.

13 Abû Kasim al-Balkhî al-Ka'bi, "Bâbu Zikri'l-Mu'tezile min Maqâlâti'l-Islamiyyîn", *Fadlu'l-İ'tizâl and Tabâkâtü'l-Mu'tezile*, ed. Fuad Seyyid (Tunus: Al-Dâru't-Tûnusiyye li'n-Nashr, 1986), 71; Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, op. cit., 531.

14 İbn Manzûr, *Lisânu 'l-'Arab*, I-XVIII, ed. Emin Muhammed Abdulvahab (Beyrût: Dâru'İhyâi't-Türâsi'l-'Arabi, 1999), VI, 116.

15 Ash'ari, *Maqâlât*, 202; Ibn Hazm, *al-Fasl*, V, 175.

16 Ibn Manzûr, *Lisânu'l-'Arab*, IX, 387-388; The word i'timād and its derivatives are mentioned as follows in texts written in the period close to Nazzām: "It is not the size of the animals that we have to believe about the condition of the animals." (Abû 'Uthman 'Amr b. Bahr al-Jâhiz, *al-Hayawân*, I-VII [ed. Abdusselâm Muhammed Harûn] (Mısır: Jamiyyatu'r-Riayeti'l-Mutakâmilah, 2004), VI, 9; "The health of the body is with the sun, and the health is separated from the one who is established in his tent and bower ('amad) .... When the people of the mines go underground, if the fire is burning, they turn towards it [i'timād.] (Jâhiz, *al-Hayawân*, V, 105); Jâhiz, also uses the word i'timād in the sense of deduction (*al-Hayawân*, V, 113).

17 See, Jâhiz, *al-Hayawân*, V, 105; Qadi Abduljabbar, *Muhît*, I, 82.

18 Shahrîstânî, *al-Milal wa'n-Nihal*, I, 42.

19 Ash'ari, *Maqâlât*, 187, 198; Ka'bi, *Maqâlât*, 70-71; Shahrîstânî, *al-Milel wa'n-Nihal*, I, 42.

20 Ash'ari, *Maqâlât*, 187; al-Ka'bi, *Maqâlât*, 71; Ibn Hazm, *al-Fasl*, V, 175.

i'timād as Muammer, who lived in the same period and city as him, had drawn for tranquility. A similar parallelism can be drawn for the thoughts of Muhammad b. Shabīb (3rd century AH). While Ibn Shabīb attributes movement to tranquillity<sup>21</sup> Nazzām attributes moving to another place to the movement of i'timād.<sup>22</sup> It is possible to increase the examples for the conceptual burden that the early Mu'tazilites attributed to rest and its parallels with the movement of i'timād. These examples provide us with a framework for the nature of the movement of i'timād: For Nazzām, an object standing in its place is in a movement of i'timād. In order to determine what Nazzām understands by the concept of i'timād, a question can be asked as follows: In Nazzām's idea of motion, what gives the quality of mobility even to an object that does not undergo a spatial change?

The Maqālat works do not provide any further information about the content of the concept of i'timād other than the relationship they establish between tranquillity and the movement of i'timād. Ibn Hazm, on the other hand, thinks that it is contrary to reason to consider tranquillity as an act of i'timād, and therefore it is not even necessary to dwell on it<sup>23</sup>. As far as I can find, the only work that gives us the answer to this question is *et-Tezkiretu fi Ahkami'l-Cevheri ve'l-Arād* by Ibn Matteveyh, a student of Qadi 'Abdulcebbār. Ibn Matteveyh (d. 469/1076), in this voluminous work, a significant part of which is related to the subject of i'timād, explains Nazzām's idea of i'timād as follows:

(Nazzām said) When we put a heavy object, such as a stone, in our hand, it pushes our hand. Therefore, there is also repulsion (defence) in a firm object. This is what is attributed to Nazzām in this regard: Since he did not accept the existence of any accident other than motion, he divided the movements into two. He argued that one of these movements is the movement of zevāl and the other is the movement of i'timād. As it is understood from our previous explanations, what he says (i'timād being a movement) is not acceptable.<sup>24</sup>

At first glance, the fact that in this passage the movement of a object standing in its place is shown as the movement of i'timād (i'timād), with reference to Nazzām, may not seem to express any difference from the early *maqālāt* works. However, when the passage is examined

more closely, the fact that i'timād is met with the concept of "pushing" (*mudafa'a*) can be considered as an additional information to the information provided by the early *maqālāt* works. Moreover, the interpretation of Nazzām's classification of movement in this passage, even if it is not very clear, draws attention to the widespread acceptance of Mu'tazilite thinkers regarding the content of the concept of i'timād and to Nazzām's attitude that differs from them. Indeed, as Ibn Mattawayh points out, while Nazzām regarded i'timād as impulsion (*mudāfa'a*), the Mu'tazilites regarded i'timād not as impulsion but as a *ma'nā* (cause) that enables impulsion.<sup>25</sup>

Even if it is a generalization, Ibn Mattawayh's statements show the prevalence of the relationship between weight and i'timād in Mu'tazilite thought: "The common opinion of all our theologian is this: There is a reason (*ma'nā*) for heavy objects to fall down, and this is weight. Likewise, there is a *ma'nā* that causes fire to rise. That is why a heavy object standing on us (i'timād) has the same effect as an object that pushes us. ... That is why the fire always rises in the same way when there is no obstruction."<sup>26</sup> By "our theologians" Ibn Mattawayh means Abu'l-Hudhayl, Abbād b. Sulaymān, Abu 'Alī al-Jubbāī, and Qadi Abduljabbar in the Basra branch of the Mu'tazila, because these thinkers considered i'timād as weight.<sup>27</sup>

Nazzām's acceptance of i'timād as a movement is not a contradictory idea in terms of his own period. As a matter of fact, Bishr b. Mu'tamir (d.210/825), the leader of the Baghdad Mu'tazilites who shared the same period with him, considered the concept of i'timād as a movement. When we consider that Bishr b. Mu'tamir was the first person to put forward the idea of birth (*tawallud*)<sup>28</sup>, that is, that the movement of an object that is realised by the movement of a human being should be attributed to him, it is not a remote possibility that he also used the concept of i'timād for the first time. According to Bishr, what sets an object in motion is the appropriate motion that is imparted to the object<sup>29</sup>. For example, our act of seeing

25 Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 538-9.

26 Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 538-539.

27 In the Basra Mu'tazilites, the cause that mediates the displacement of object is generally accepted as weight. Although the idea of i'timād is attributed to Abu'l-Hudhayl, one of the leading thinkers of the Basra Mu'tazilites, it is not clear what he meant by this concept (Qadi Abduljabbar, *al-Mughnī*, IX, 12). Abu 'Alī al-Jubbāī, who appears to be the first thinker whose thoughts on i'timād are known in detail, accepts i'timād as a weight. It is understood from Mu'tazilite texts that al-Jubbāī formed this opinion under the influence of 'Abbād b. Sulaymān (d. 250/864) (Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 538).

28 Shahrastānī, *al-Milel wa'n-Nihal*, I, 48.

29 Abū 'Uthman 'Amr b. Bahr al-Jāhiz, "Kitābu'l-Masā'il wa'l-Jawābāt fi'l-Ma'rife", *al-Rasā'ilu'l-Kalāmiyyah*, ed. Ali Bū Melhim (Beyrūt: Dār and Mektebetu'l-Hilāl, 2004),111; see also, Qadi Abduljabbar, *Mughnī*, IX, 12.

21 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 202.

22 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 198, 201.

23 Ibn Hazm, *al-Fasl*, V, 177.

24 Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 531.

is realized by opening the eyelids. Bishr expresses opening the eyelids with the concept of i'timād. Bishr gives the example of throwing a stone to explain that the act of seeing should be attributed to human beings. According to Bishr, in the example of throwing a stone, what makes this action belong to us is that the stone was pushed by us. In the same way, Bishr says that it is the opening of the eyelids (i'timād) that makes seeing belong to us.<sup>30</sup> Leaving aside the debates about the attribution of actions to the one who does them, in this comparison, throwing the stone is accepted as equivalent to the act of seeing, and pushing the stone is accepted as equivalent to opening the eyelids (i'timād). The use of the word “pushing” (def) to explain the concept of i'timād in the stone example given by Bishr reveals that Nazzām thought in parallel with some of the early thinkers in accepting the act of i'timād as “defense” (mudafa'a). As a matter of fact, according to both al-Bishr and Nazzām, i'timād is regarded as a movement.

Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād is another theologian whose thought on movement we should mention in order to identify the sources of Nazzām's idea of i'timād. The concept of i'timād is not attributed to Mu'ammār in any text. However, Nazzām's statements about the movement of i'timād overlap with Mu'ammār's explanation of tranquillity. According to Mu'ammār, no matter what position an object is in, it is always in contact with another object. According to him, every object is in tranquil because of the contact of objects with each other (mumāsāt).<sup>31</sup> Mu'ammār sees contact with another object as preventing the object from movement, and therefore, he thinks that objects can only be stable. Nazzām, on the other hand, argues that objects are mobile for the same reason.

Another common point between Bishr b. Mu'temir, Muammer, and Nazzām is that all three of them were supporters of nature (tab').<sup>32</sup> For the supporters of nature, who regard i'timād as motion, God created the objects based on a certain natural tendency. Therefore, it is sufficient to activate the natural tendency in the objects for the realization of motion.

It seems that in early Mu'tazilite kalām, i'timād was considered either as the repulsive movement in objects or, as seen in the Mutazilites of Basra, as the cause of repulsion, and this cause was determined as *weight*. Among these two approaches, Nazzām, although he was from Basra, preferred the Baghdad Mutazilite approach to the issue and accepted i'timād as a pushing motion. It is possible to see these two different interpretations of i'timād in the

later kalāmists.<sup>33</sup> Unlike the early period, in the later period, the word defense (mudafa'a) was preferred instead of pushing (daf').<sup>34</sup> As Ījī states, those who think that movement moves to another place for a reason either accepted i'timāda as the defense itself or as the cause of the defense.<sup>35</sup>

The following quotation from Jāhiz (d. 255/868), attributed to Nazzām, confirms that the movement of i'timād means the pushing of one of the objects against the other. In this quotation, the word *daf'*, which comes from the same root as the word *defense*, is used and the resistance of the objects to each other is shown as the cause of the movement:

(Nazzām says) The air, in spite of all its delicacy, accepts to be surrounded, as we see in the example of air compressed in a bag. The air *pushes* the bag that surrounds it from all four sides. The *pushing* of the air is due to the cause of being surrounded (mahsūr) and being separated from its form.<sup>36</sup>

As clearly stated in this passage, for Nazzām, there are two causes of the repulsive motion in bodies: (i) being surrounded (muhsūr) and (ii) the target. The situation of these two causes appears as follows:

What is meant by “being surrounded” is the effect of the environment on the object. Nazzām is of the opinion that according to the intensity of the surroundings (inhisār), the object transforms, and the squeezing movement takes place. In this case, it is possible to say that three intermediate movements are decisive in the process of movement for Nazzām: (i) the enclosure of the object by another object, (ii) the internal impulse/squeezing of the object in accordance with this enclosure, and (iii) the pushing movement of the object as a result of this internal impulse. Since Nazzām considers the effect of the environment necessary for the movement of the object, he elaborates on the resistance

33 'Ījī, *Mawāqif*, 125-131.

34 Ibn Sinā, who appears to be the first person to define the concept of i'timād in accordance with formal logic, uses the concepts of i'timād and inclination as synonyms and gives the word defence (mudafa'a) a dominant place in his definition: “It is the quality that enables a object to push against the elements that prevent it from moving in any direction” (Abu 'Alī Ibn Sinā, “Risālatu'l-Hudūd”, *Tis'u Resā'il fi'l-Hikmeti wa't-Tabi'iyāt*, (Cairo: Dār'u'l-'Arab, n.d.), 65. After Ibn Sinā, we see that the concept of i'timād was explained in the Mu'tazilites not with the word *def'* but with the word *defense*. For example, Ibn Mattawayh defines this concept as follows: “I'timād is the meaning that enables the place to show repulsion (*defence*) against the factors with which it is in contact when the preventive factors are removed” (Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 530-531).

35 'Ījī, *Mawāqif*, 125.

36 Jāhiz, *al-Hayawān*, V. 42.

30 Jāhiz, “Kitābu'l-Masā'il wa'l-Jawābāt”, 111.

31 Ka'bī, *Maqālāt*, s. 71.

32 Qadi Abduljabbar, *Muhīt*, I, 386-388; Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa'n-Nihal*, I, 48.

provided by the air through which the ascent and descent take place. According to him, the air is restrained in this celestial orb. Since every restrained object must transform according to the intensity of the compression, Nazzām considers air to have three layers: (i) air close to the ground, (ii) air close to the sun, and (iii) air in the middle of the two. Each layer of air and each form of air differs from each other due to the moisture and other mixtures it contains. For example, wind descends due to the moisture in it.<sup>37</sup>

By explaining the motion of pushing through the example of air, Nazzām tried to show that there is a motion of i'timād in every object. As a matter of fact, some kalāmists in the later period wanted to show that there was no i'timād in some object on the grounds that there was no perceptible weight in the air.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, Nazzām wanted to show that there is a push in all objects by proving that there is a push in an object with the least weight. The fact that the subject of i'timād was discussed in detail in the following period with the same words (“daght” and “daf”) through the example of air<sup>39</sup> shows that both Nazzām's influence on the following periods and al-Jāhiz's quotation show that i'timād and pushing (def) are identical concepts.

For Nazzām, the effect of the environment on objects represents the first stage of the movement process. According to him, it is wrong to see the effect coming from outside the object as the only cause of movement. In addition to this external effect of the environment, the objects must be transformed and squeezed according to this effect in order to speak of the movement of an object.

The intermediate movements, which are expressed as squeezing (daght) and transformation (*taqallub*) due to the external effect of the environment, should be considered in the context of the idea of being intertwined (*intervention*), which Nazzām considers necessary for objects. As an opponent of atomism, al-Nāzām, who thought that the division would continue forever in a substance divided into two, thought that bodies were not composed of equivalent substances (*mutamāsīl*) but of an unlimited number of bodies, each of which had different effects.<sup>40</sup> For

Nazzām, weight and other qualities expressed as accidents by the atomists are substances (*jawhar*) that constitute the object. According to him, elements such as weight, lightness, whiteness and blackness, warmth, coldness, sweetness, sourness, wetness and dryness, which are opposites of each other, and redness, yellowness, greenness, odours, and flavours, which are not opposites of each other, are all substances. Together, they form an object and constantly act on each other:

Everything is intertwined with its opposite and different (*intervention*). An opposite object prevents and corrupts the other, just as sweetness and bitterness, coldness and heat corrupt or prevent each other. The intertwining of coldness, sourness or sweetness can be given as examples of differences. Light is intertwined with heavy, there are many light objects that have more power than heavy objects, although they are less in quantity. When it is intertwined with it, that is, the lesser in quantity but greater in strength dominates the greater in quantity but lesser in strength... Colour, taste and smell are intertwined. All of these are objects.<sup>41</sup>

Defending that objects can be intertwined with their opposites (*muḍāḥala*) means accepting that one can locate the other.<sup>42</sup> As a matter of fact, according to Ka'bi (d. 319/931), Nazzām defended the possibility of two pure substances existing in the same space (*hayyiz*).<sup>43</sup> Another issue that makes the squeezing-pushing motion that provides the dynamics within the object possible for Nazzām is that objects have a nature consisting of pairs rather than singles.<sup>44</sup>

According to Hayyāt, for Nazzām, every object has a nature. Fire has the nature of rising, water has the nature of flowing, and a heavy stone has the nature of falling. It is impossible for objects to create a movement different from their nature. Therefore, the transformation of heat into cold and cold into heat is not possible. However, for Nazzām, this does not mean that opposite objects cannot come together. According to him, heat and cold, for example,

37 Jāhiz, *al-Hayawān*, V, 42.

38 For example see. Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 530-531, 536; Nisāburī, *el-Mesāil*, 229.

39 Here Ibn Mattawayh quotes and evaluates Abu Hashim's views through the example of air. See, Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirah*, 542-543.

40 Nazzām's statements regarding the rejection of atomism are as follows: “There is no unit that is not a unit of it. There is no part that is not a part of it. There is no division that is not a half of it. It is possible for a unit to be divided infinitely. There is no end in terms of division” (Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 184; see also Khayyāt, *Intisār*, 33; Shahrīstānī, *al-Mīl wa'n-Nihal*, I, 42-43; Baghdādī, *al-Farq Bayn al-Firāq*, 126; al-Shaykh al-Mufīd Muḥameed al-'Ukbarī, *Awā'ilu'l-Maqālāt*, ed. Ibrahim el-Ensārī, el-Mu'temeru'l-Alemī li

Alfiyyeti's-Sheyh'l-Mu'fīd, 1413, Tehran, p. 95); For the rejection of the idea of *mutamāsiliyyah* in objects by Nazzām, see. Al-Rāzī, *Muhassal*, p. 131; for extensive information on the Kalamists' idea of atoms, cf. S. Pines, *Mezhebu'z-zerre 'inda al-Muslimīn*, trans. Muhammad 'Abd al-Hadi Abu Zeyde (Cairo: Maktabatu'n-Nahdeti'l-Misriyya, 1946).

41 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 179; also for the relation of opposites to each other, see. Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 188, 212; Khayyāt, *Intisār*, 45; According to Shahrīstānī's explanations, Nazzām argued that sometimes objects are accidents and sometimes accidents are nothing but objects (Shahrīstānī, *al-Mīl wa'n-Nihal*, I, 43).

42 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 189.

43 Ka'bi, *Maqālāt*, 70; Baḡdādī, *al-Farq Bayn al-Firāq*, 67.

44 Jāhiz, *al-Hayawān*, V, 11-40.

are also inherent in their nature to come together (ictima') when the dispute between them is prevented.<sup>45</sup>

From Nazzām's point of view, another condition that enables movement to occur is the object's aim of establishing a correspondence with a form like itself, which has been isolated due to external effects. The example of water, fire, and air attributed to Nazzām is explanatory: When stone is prevented from falling, water from flowing, and fire from flaming and rising, they exert pressure against the limiting factors in order to realise the movement appropriate to them.<sup>46</sup>

The early kalām-philosophers discussed the basic conditions of motion through the rhetoric of "lā fi shay'" (without being in something), "lā ilā shay'" (without being towards something), and "lā 'an shay'" (without being from something), and whether space, destination, and source-space are necessary. For Nazzām, it is not possible for a moving object to move lā fi shay' and lā ilā shay' (without being in something, without being towards something).<sup>47</sup> Therefore, for him, the condition of motion is space and target. The rhetoric of lā fi shay' and lā ilā shay' is an explanation identical to the explanation of the conditions of compression and target that we quoted from Cāhiz.

In the quotations from Nazzām, the concept of goal (ghaye) is given in terms of shape, source (tilād), substance, and first nature.<sup>48</sup> Even if there is no difference in the use of these contents, in some statements, the endeavour of objects is given as reaching their spatial goals, while in others it is given as realising a tendency in their first nature. In Cahiz's transcription, for example, the goal of a submerged air-filled jumpsuit is to join its source, that is, the air; likewise, the goal of water is to join the water by showing vertical movement. Therefore, according to Cahiz, expressing the nature of objects as mere ascent and descent is wrong. What is correct is to say that objects have the nature of rising in the air or descending in the air, while the air is not in this way:

Air is a substance that enables rising and falling objects to be known. It is in the nature of objects either to rise in the air or to fall in the air. Air is not in either of these two ways.<sup>49</sup>

45 Khayyât, *Intisâr*, 47-48.

46 Khayyât, *Intisâr*, sp 45.

47 Ash'arî, *Maqâlât*, 186; In Arsitotle, movement is in something and towards something: "Since the mover always moves something in and towards something" (see. Aristotle, *Fizik*, trans. Saffet Babür (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi publishing, 2005), 224b, 249a).

48 Jâhiz, *al-Hayawân*, V, 15, 42-43.

49 Jâhiz, *al-Hayawân*, V, 43.

The main purpose of Jâhiz and Khayyât's (300/913) explanations on the concepts of squeezing (dagt) and gathering (ictima') within the framework of the explanation of the conditions of surrounding and target, which are seen by Nazzām as the cause of the pushing/i'timād movement, is to clarify the idea of *kumūn* and *zuhūr*, which is almost identified with Nazzām's name in Islamic thought. According to this idea, which states that all beings were created at once, humans, animals, plants, and inanimate objects were created at once. Therefore, according to this idea, most of the things are hidden in some of them (*kumūn*); in this respect, the priority and succession in things are related to their emergence from their places (*zuhūr*), not to their existence.<sup>50</sup>

Horevitz establishes a relationship between Nazzām's idea of *kumūn* and the Stoics' understanding of physics. According to him, in Nazzām's thought, the force that protects objects comes from their being compressed together, whereas in Stoic philosophy, the force that objects acquire comes from their being stretched. Therefore, Horevitz states unequivocally that the movement of i'timād has the same meaning as the Stoic concept of τόπος. Horevitz states that this concept means tension (tawattur) and the movement of the soul. According to him, in Stoic thought, τόπος enables the constituent parts of objects to hold together on the one hand and to keep them apart at certain intervals on the other. In Stoic thought, all power in objects is generated by the relaxation and tightening of tension. According to Horevitz, for Nazzām, as for the Stoics, i'timād should be understood as the persistence of the object, which finds its basis in the relation of opposition. As evidence for his view, he argues that the Stoics regarded tranquility as a τόπος movement.<sup>51</sup> Ali Sāmī en-Nasshār agrees with Horevitz that the movement of i'timād and the movement of tension in the Stoic philosophy are identical movements and states that the movement of i'timād corresponds to the movement of *kumūn*, while the movement of *intikāl* corresponds to the movement of *zuhūr*.<sup>52</sup>

The movement process described above in the axis of tightening shows that the relationship between the movement of *kumūn* and *i'timād* is inevitable. Therefore, we will

50 Baghdâdî, *al-Farq Bayna'l-Firaq*, 128-129; Shahrîstânî, *al-Milal wa'n-Nihal*, I, 43. For Nazzām's view of *Kumūn* see, Orhan Sener Koloğlu, Ibn Hazm'da Kumūn ve Yaratma", *Uludağ University Theology Faculty Journal*, XVII, vol: 1, 2008, 193-218.

51 S. Horovitz, "Ueber den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam" *Jahres-Bericht des Jüdisch-theologischen Seminars Fraenckel'scher Stiftung*, Breslau, 1909 18, I am thanking to the Research Assistant Remzi Avcı for translating the text to me; Abû Rîde, Abdilhâdi, *Ibrahim b. Seyyâr en-Nazzâm ve Ârauhu'l-Kelâmiyyetu'l-Felsefiyye* (Qahira: Matbatu Lajnatu't-Te'lif wa't-Tarjume wa'n-Nashr, 1946), 139.

52 Ali Sāmī an-Nashshar, *Neşetu'l-Fikri'l-İslâmî* (Kahire: Dâru'l-Mearif, n.d.), I, 497-498 351; see also, Muhammed Aziz Azmi Salim, *Ibrahim b. Seyyâr en-Nazzâm ve'l-Fikri'n-Nakdi fi'l-İslâm* (İskenderiye: Muassat Şebâbi'l-Jâmiati, 1983).

have to agree with Horevitz and Ali Sami en-Nasshar to a considerable extent. However, intra-object tension, in other words, *kumūn*, corresponds to squeezing in terms of the conditions of motion, as seen in the above passage quoted from Cāhiz. This means that the tightness of the object is not the movement of i'timād/pushing itself, but a cause that enables it.

As for the relationship between the theory of Kumūn and Stoicism, although it seems difficult to determine Nazzām's relationship with Stoic thought with historical data, it is possible to see strong similarities in terms of intellectual content. In his works, *Thoughts*, the Stoic Aurelius attributes all movements in the universe to the movement of instinct in objects and likens the universe to the weaving of a tightly woven fabric.<sup>53</sup>

For Nazzām, to say that the movement of i'timād corresponds to the movement of pushing is not only compatible with the expressions that are frequently mentioned in the maqālāt works as “tranquillity is the movement of i'timād”, but it is also compatible with the idea of kumūn, which is almost identified with his name. Saying that opposing substances are in constant pushing makes it explicable for an object standing in its place to have the characteristic of movement. After determining the nature of the movement of i'timād in this way, we can investigate what the sentence “The principle of all movements is i'timād”, which is frequently emphasised in the maqālāt works with reference to Nazzām, expresses.

## II. THE FUNCTION OF I'TIM D MOVEMENT

For Nazzām, the movement of i'timād does not only refer to a type of movement. According to him, this movement is the principle that enables the displacement of a object, the acquisition of different states by substances, physical movements such as the change of accidents at every moment, and mental movements such as cognitive acts. It is possible to find a significant part of Nazzām's views on the source of a principle with such a wide range of effects and its causal relationship with its results in Ash'arī's *Maqālāt*:

Some say: The meaning of movement, the meaning of kawn (becoming), and the meaning of all movement is i'timād. Some of them are transfer, and some of them are not

53 Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus, *Thoughts*, trans. George Long (London: 1880), 102 (IV. Chapter, 40); W. T. Jones, *Klasik Düşünce Batı Felsefe Tarihi*, I-V, trans. Hakkı Hünler (İstanbul: Paradigma publishing, 2006), I, 505.

transfer. Nazzām is the one who accepted this view and claimed the following: When a object moves from one place to another, the movement takes place in the first place. This movement is the i'timādāt of the first space that necessitates kawn (becoming) in the second space. The kawn in the second space is the movement of the object in the second space.<sup>54</sup>

Three points about Nazzām's idea of movement are noteworthy in this passage: (i) The movement of i'timād is the principle of all kinds of change. (ii) The movement of i'timād originates from the object/space. (iii) There is a necessary causal relationship between the principle of movement and its result. The equivalents of these judgments in Nazzām's natural thought appear as follows:

As seen in Ash'arī's quotation above, the constitutive relationship between i'timād and movement is expressed by the concept of *ma'nā*. What is meant by the concept of ma'nā, which Mu'ammār used for the first time and then started to be used frequently in the Mu'tazilite tradition, is to be a cause. As a matter of fact, according to Mu'ammār, the differentiation of movement from tranquillity and tranquillity from movement can only be due to a ma'nā.<sup>55</sup>

For Nazzām, movement is not only a spatial change. According to him, the change in all categories that can be attributed to a object is a movement:

(According to Nazzām) all human actions are only movements. Tranquillity is movement-i i'timād. Knowledge and will are movements of the soul. What he means by this movement is not movement-i transport. According to Nazzām, movement is the principle (mabdei) of all kinds of change. The movement accepted by philosophers for quality, quantity, vad', space, time, etc. is the same as the movement accepted by Nazzām.<sup>56</sup>

54 Ah'arī, *Maqālāt*, 201.

55 Ka'bī, *Maqālāt*, 71; Mu'tazilite historian Khayyāt summarises Mu'ammār's views on ma'nā as follows in his work *Intisār*: “Since there is rest for one object and motion for the other, there must be a cause of motion that is not valid for the object at rest but valid for the moving object. This reason is the meaning. There is another ma'nā that also sets this ma'nā in motion. The sequence continues in this way.” (Khayyāt, *Intisār*, 55).

56 Shahrastānī, *el-Milel ve'n-Nihal*, I, p. 42.



As 'Icī emphasises, the majority of the kalāmists say that motion is only related to space and call this movement in space as kevn (becoming).<sup>57</sup> When we look at the Mu'tazilite sources, it is possible to determine that only mechanical movement is accepted. As a matter of fact, Kadi Abduljabbār defines the concept of kevn as the acquisition of space by an object.<sup>58</sup> For Aristotle, there is no movement in substance, relativity, activity and passivity; there is only movement in quality, quantity and space.<sup>59</sup> Judging from al-Shahristānī's statements, Nazzām is of the opinion that there is movement in all categories. Although it is difficult to determine this much from other texts, it is not difficult to determine that Nazzām accepted movement in quality and quantity as well as space.<sup>60</sup> In fact, contrary to the Aristotelian tradition and the widespread Mu'tazilite thought, it is possible to find some of his statements indicating that he accepted movement in substance. As a matter of fact, Nazzām, as mentioned earlier, states that the substances in the same object increase or decrease each other's influence, and that the quantity changes in accordance with this. The fact that change is spread over many categories in this idea, in which the internal dynamics of objects is determinative, stems from the fact that the qualities that are generally regarded as accidents are regarded as objects/substance.<sup>61</sup> For Nazzām, the ability of two opposing qualities, which constitute the subcomponents of objects, to break the effect of each other is due to the movement of repulsion/i'timād between the objects.<sup>62</sup>

Since the subject of movement is not only determined as space, it is necessary to say that spatial change is not an essential condition for movement for Nazzām, contrary to the common kalām understanding. From this point of view, it is possible to say that the difference between Nazzām's explanation, which regards being at rest as i'timād, and that of other kalām-philosophers, who state spatial change as a condition, stems from the conceptual framework established for movement. While other kalāmists understand movement as displacement,

57 'Ijī, *Mawāqif*, 162.

58 In Qadi Abduljabbar's works, kawn (becoming) is defined as "that which provides one of the different possible positions (aspects) of a substance" and the parts of kawn are mentioned as absolute kevn, tranquillity, tekevun (formation), movement, mukarebe (convergence), and mufaraqa (separation). Absolute creation is the first creation; it is the existence of the substance while it does not exist. Tranquillity (being constant) is the continuation of the state of absolute becoming. Formation (takawwun) is the continuation of the substance in the same position throughout time intervals. Movement, on the other hand, is the formation of substance after its opposite, or is the change of position of the object (Qadi Abduljabbar, *Muhit*, I, 41).

59 Aristotle, *Physics*, 226a.

60 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 188.

61 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 179.

62 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 188.

Nazzām includes all kinds of change within the scope of movement. The fact that the kalāmists, who say that there can be repulsion but not movement in a motionless object, consider movement impossible in a motionless object stems from the necessary connection they establish between movement and spatial change.<sup>63</sup>

On the other hand, since Nazzām sees the principle of all kinds of becoming and all kinds of movement as itimād, we can say that the effect of this principle is extended to quality, quantity, and other categories. This means that whether we think of them as objects or as subcomponents of objects, Nazzām considered the squeezing-pushing movement between substances as the mover of all kinds of movement.

From Nazzām's point of view, it is impossible for accidents, and hence movements, to be visible; only colors can be visible, even in objects.<sup>64</sup> The fact that Nazzām does not stipulate the condition of visibility for movement is an explanation that is compatible with his wide range of movements. Therefore, all kinds of mental acts, such as knowledge and will, are accepted as the movements of the soul, which is regarded as a transparent object. Since Nazzām accepts i'timād as the principle of all kinds of change, it is expected that acts such as knowing and willing would be explained by Nazzām in accordance with this idea. Indeed, according to him, the soul's actions are realized either through the senses or through the soul's choice. Nazzām's explanation of actions that are realised through the senses is the same as his explanation of physical movements in the external world. For example, sound, as an object, reaches the soul, which is a transparent object, by being subjected to the influence of different objects until it reaches the soul, and thus sensation is realized. Therefore, Nazzām sees no difference in terms of functioning between the arrival of sensory data to the soul and the transport of any object to another place. As for acts of choice, Nazzām attributes the realisation of these activities to the formation of opposing motives (ḥātīr) in the mind. His explanation of the functioning of choice through the relation of opposition is compatible with the explanations that explain the formation of movement by the resistance of opposing internal components against each other. Moreover, for Nazzām, the different motivators of the soul, which are expressed as *havāṭīr*, are also objects.<sup>65</sup> Therefore, the relationship between two opposing mental states is considered as the relationship between two objects.

The above passage from Esh'arī's *Maqālāt*, in which the movement of an object to another

63 'Ijī, *Mawāqif*, 125.

64 Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 205.

65 Baghdādī, *al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq*, 126.

place is attributed to i'timād, is a judgment that all kalāmists who accept the idea of i'timād agree on. What makes Nazzām's ideas questionable is that he sees i'timād as the work of an object/space, not an external effector and that he explains the movement of an object between two places with a relation of necessary causality. Nazzām's view of motion as originating in the locality, in other words, as originating in nature, distinguishes him from the atomist tradition of the Mu'tazilites, such as Abu'l-Hudhayl and Qadi Abduljabbar.

Based on what Qadi Abduljabbar (d.415/1024) says both in his *Mughnī* and in *Muhīt bi't-Taklīf*, in which his views are collected, it is understood that physical events and, accordingly, the actions of the agent in the external world are explained with two different approaches in Mu'tazilite thought: (i) the mode of explanation based on i'timād as a quality created by an external entity, and (ii) the mode of explanation that argues that the principle of movement does not originate from an external entity but from the object, and therefore physical movements are realized through nature (tab'). Qadi Abduljabbar's statements below describe this debate within the Mu'tazilites:

The renewal of the object by combining and separating it is either through *hudūs* or, as the people of kumūn and zuhūr say, through *initikāl* from another place.<sup>66</sup>

According to Qadi Abduljabbar, who defends the first approach, what enables an object to move to another space is i'timād. According to Qadi Abduljabbar, who thinks that i'timād is weight, the passage of an object to a second space is possible with the weight formed in the first space. From his point of view, although the realization of movement depends on the formation of i'timād, the formation of i'timād does not necessarily mean that movement will take place. According to him, just as the power in human beings is open to different directions, i'timād is open to different directions. In this case, the possibilities that can be subject to the movement of the object should be reduced to one so that the object can move in one direction. For Kadi Abdulcebbbar, this allocative principle is none other than the movement created by an external agent. From this point of view, in Qadi Abduljabbar's idea of motion, the movement of the body to another place requires an agent in terms of both the creation of i'timād and the limitation of the possible directions to one.<sup>67</sup>

Qadi Abduljabbar counts the early Mu'tazilite thinkers Thumāme (d. 213/828), Mu'ammār,

66 Qadi Abduljabbar, *Muhīt*, I, 56.

67 Qadi Abduljabbar, *Mughnī*, IX, 10-50.

Nazzām, Salih Kubbe (d. 246/860) and Jāhīz as the representatives of the second approach. According to him, the most decisive aspect of this approach is that the principle of movement is seen as originating from the object.<sup>68</sup>

It is possible to support Qadi Abduljabbar's statement that the principle of motion is spatial for Nazzām with other texts. As far as it is understood from these texts, Nazzām attributes the existence of motion in a body to the motion coming from another space. As understood from Esh'ari's *Maqālāt*, when we consider an object in the direction of AB, the realisation of motion depends on the occurrence of a pushing/i'timād movement at A for Nazzām. Thus, the pushing movement that takes place in position A enables the object to move to position B.<sup>69</sup>

It is widely accepted to say that the principle that enables the movement of an object comes from something else. As a matter of fact, according to Aristoteles, every moving object is moved by something. In forced displacements, i.e. displacements such as in the example of throwing a stone, movement takes its principle from something else.<sup>70</sup> In terms of the history of thought, the most controversial issue concerns the explanation of the realisation of perpetual movement. To put it with Aristotle's question, what enables an object to move to other points after it leaves the object with which it is in contact?<sup>71</sup>

Aristotle puts forward two types of movements to answer this question: (i) movements that are by nature and (ii) movements that are contrary to nature. By the former, Aristotle understands displacements that take place without any coercion, while by the latter he understands forced movements that are contrary to nature.<sup>72</sup> Nazzām's explanation of movement, as attributed to him in many texts, is parallel to Aristotle's classification:

(Nazzām said) Actions that exceed the limit of human power are acts of Allah by the fulfilment of nature (hilqat), that is, Allah has given the stone such a nature, He has created it in such a way that when you push it upwards, it is pushed, and when you reach the end of your pushing power, the stone returns to its original place by nature.<sup>73</sup>

68 Qadi Abduljabbar, *Mughnī*, IX, 10-20; *Muhīt*, I, 386-388.

69 Ash'ari, *Maqālāt*, 201.

70 Aristotle, *Physics*, 241b.

71 Aristotle, *Physics*, 266b-267a.

72 Aristotle, *Physics*, 252a; 254b.

73 Shahrastānī, *al-Milāl wa'n-Nihal*, I, 43; ayrıca bk. Qadi Abduljabbar, *Muhīt*, I, 380; al-Khawārizmī, Ruknuddin, b. al-Malahîmî, *Kitābu'l-Fâik fi Usuli'd-Dîn*, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Martin McDermot (Teheran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies Free University of Berlin, 2007), 141.

From Aristotle's point of view, since movement is a possibility in displacements due to nature, movement becomes an activity with the removal of hindering factors.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, the principle in such movements is the removal of the hindering factors. As it is understood from Hayyāt's quotation, for Nazzām, for example, when the hindering conditions that prevent water from flowing, stones from falling, and fire from rising are removed, each of them moves in accordance with their nature.<sup>75</sup> Nazzām considers an external compressive movement necessary for the removal of the restraining conditions. Nazzām, who must have thought that natural movements are realised through the object's own possibilities, sees movement not as the work of an external being, but as the work of the moving object.<sup>76</sup>

For Aristotle, in the case of forced movements provided by the application of an external force, the object continues to move after the application of the force. According to him, it is the environment, in his own words, natural elements such as air and water, that make the movement of the object continuous after the movement.<sup>77</sup> As understood from the commentary of Aristotle's commentator Ebu'l-Ferec (d. 435/1044), for Aristotle, in forced movement, "The stone does not move permanently with the force given by the thrower, but continues to move with the air that carries it successively. Because it is pushed by the thrower's throwing the stone and compressed by the air."<sup>78</sup> Nazzām seems to agree with Aristotle in saying that movement becomes continuous under the influence of a natural medium such as air and water. As mentioned earlier, according to Nazzām, all objects are in a vertical or upward movement in the air. The medium (air and water) compresses the objects it surrounds, causing them to be pushed and directed towards their natural sources. Therefore, in order for objects to be displaced, they need to be pushed and for this movement to take place, they need to be surrounded and compressed by the environment.<sup>79</sup> In other words, movement is the object being subjected to a pushing movement. With this view, Nazzām is also under the influence of Aristotle. As a matter of fact, according to Aristotle, the throwing motion is a repulsive motion and derives its principle from another object.<sup>80</sup>

For Nazzām, there is a necessary causal relationship between the movement of i'timād

and its consequences. As Kadi Abdulcebbar emphasises, the reason for accepting such a necessity is that the principle of movement is thought to originate from the locality. In Nazzām's thought, every object has a goal of returning to its natural place. The idea of goal makes it inevitable to defend the idea of necessary causality. Indeed, as Nazzām clearly states, "Natural movements do not vanish until nature vanishes."<sup>81</sup> Therefore, according to him, since every object has a natural character, objects will move according to the effects of the environment and their ability to move.

## CONCLUSION

In Islamic thought, the concept of i'timād is considered either as the pushing movement that enables objects to move from one point to another or as the cause that enables this movement. This cause was mostly accepted as weight. For Nazzām, i'timād is the movement of one object pushing another. According to him, there are two reasons for this movement: (i) the object is surrounded by a natural environment such as air and water, and (ii) every object has the goal of turning towards its natural source. For Nazzām, being surrounded brings about compression and the transformation of the internal components accordingly and their being in the interior-position. The idea of motion that Nazzām explains on the axis of squeezing and pushing is compatible with the idea of kumūn. Because in this thought, all opposite qualities constitute objects as objects.

Nazzām's explanation of displacement is an Aristotelian explanation. It is possible to find Aristotle's division of movement into natural and unnatural (forced) in the examples given by Nazzām, even if not in terms of terms. It is also noteworthy that Nazzām explains natural movements in terms of the removal of obstructive elements and forced movements in terms of the effect of the environment (air and water) and repulsion.

For Nazzām, the movement of i'timād is the principle not only of displacement but also of all phenomena in the universe. Therefore, according to him, movement is not only a relocation from one place to another. According to him, there is always an ongoing movement even in a object that is said to be stationary. In Nazzām's thought, movement is realised in substance. With this attitude, he pioneered the philosophers who accepted movement in substance.

81 Khayyât, *Intisâr*, 44.

74 Aristotle, *Physics*, 255b.

75 Khayyât, *Intisâr*, 45.

76 Jâhiz, *al-Hayawân*, V: 81-82.

77 Aristotle, *Physics*, 266b.

78 Aristotle, *al-Tabi'a*, (İbn Samh, Ibn 'Adi, Matta ibn Yunus and Abu'l-Farac, Ibn Tayyib Şerhleri ile beraber) I-II, trans. Ishaq b. Hunayn (Qahire: al-Hey'etu'l- Mısıriyya, 1984), II, 936.

79 Ash'arî, *Maqâlât*, pp. 201-202.

80 Aristotle, *Physics*, 243a.

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